- Introduction
- Who are today’s 14–24-year-olds?
- How are the socio-demographic markers of adulthood changing?
- The challenges to traditional understandings of journeys to adulthood
- Mapping new pathways to adulthood
1. The relevance of the five markers
Evidence of how people perceive the five markers is mixed. A 2024 study in the Journal of Adult Development by Megan Wright and Sophie von Stumm found that less than half of the participants – adults aged 18–77 living in the UK – endorsed these markers as adulthood-defining characteristics. Full-time employment was endorsed by 28%, parenthood by 26% and marriage by 22% (see Figure 10)[ref]Wright, M., and von Stumm, S. (2024). Perceptions of Adulthood: What Does it Mean to be Grown-Up?. Journal of Adult Development 32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10804-024-09477-8. [/ref].
But there is also evidence of the enduring presence of the five markers in contemporary imaginings of adulthood. In a 2021 YouGov survey of the UK public, a majority of respondents included having a full-time job, moving out of your parent’s home, getting married, and having children as being either ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’ markers of being ‘grown up’ (see Figure 4)[ref]McDonnell, A., and Ibbetson, C. (2021). What are the signs of being a grown up? [online]. YouGov. Available from: https://yougov.co.uk/society/articles/34454-signs-of-being-grown-up [Accessed 12 September 2024].[/ref].
Figure 4: How good an indicator, if at all, do you think each of the following are in meaning someone is a grown up? (% who said ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’ indicator) (2021)[ref]McDonnell, A., and Ibbetson, C. (2021). What are the signs of being a grown up? [online]. YouGov. Available from: https://yougov.co.uk/society/articles/34454-signs-of-being-grown-up [Accessed 12 September 2024].[/ref]
Surveys also provide evidence that Gen Z-ers continue to aspire to many of the five markers, with a majority wanting a property, full-time employment and marriage (or civil partnership) (see Figure 5). A more recent survey of Gen Z found that 81% would buy a home if they could[ref]Lucas, O., Moller Vallgarda, L., and Steen, B. (2024). Society Watch 2024: Understanding the new generation of voters. National Centre for Social Research.[/ref].
Figure 5: Aspirations of Gen Z[ref]Channel 4 (2023). Beyond Z: The real truth about British Youth [online]. Available from: https://assets-corporate.channel4.com/_flysystem/s3/2023-02/Channel%204%20-%20Beyond%20Z%20report%20-%20FINAL%20%28Accessible%29.pdf.[/ref]
The attainability of these aspirations has been a recurring feature of our discussions with young people to date, serving as a warning about placing too much weight on particular socio-demographic markers in a context of perceived unobtainability. The continuation of these norms was described as creating pressures in young people’s lives as well a sense of failure and frustration if markers prove out of reach.
Suggestions for boosting the relevance of the socio-demographic markers from the Youth Insight Group and wider research include:
Cohabitation: Given marriage is happening later, if at all, for today’s young people, but acknowledging the importance of partnering in many people’s journeys, cohabitation can be seen as an alternative, intermediary, marker despite limitations in the data. As Figure 6 highlights, in England and Wales the proportion of 16–29-year-olds who are living together as a couple, whether married or cohabiting, has remained broadly stable since 2002, but the split between the two has shifted significantly. In 2002, 13% of all 16–29-year-olds were married and 16% cohabiting, while in 2022, only 7% were married and 20% were cohabiting[ref]Office for National Statistics (2024). Population estimates by marital status and living arrangements, England and Wales. Available from: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesbymaritalstatusandlivingarrangements.[/ref]. This marker is supported by data that shows more people are choosing to live together before marriage, and for a longer time[ref]Centre for Population Change (2020). How partnerships have changed in the UK over the last 30 years. Available from: www.cpc.ac.uk/docs/2020_PB50_How_partnerships_have_changed_in_the_UK.pdf.[/ref]. While detailed data on relationship dynamics is lacking, it is likely that increasing rates of cohabitation have changed patterns of relationship stability and churn for today’s 16–29-year-olds.
Figure 6: Proportion of those aged 16–29 living as couple, showing split between marriage and cohabitation (England and Wales)[ref]Office for National Statistics (2024). Population estimates by marital status and living arrangements, England and Wales. Available from: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populationestimatesbymaritalstatusandlivingarrangements.[/ref]
Inactivity, unemployment and ‘quality’ employment: The ‘starting work’ marker was described as being particularly unilluminating, given it doesn’t differentiate between those who are starting work later due to further studies and those who become unemployed or economically inactive, nor does it capture new working patterns among young people, such as combining part-time work with longer-term study.
Young people who are not in education, employment or training (NEET), as well as the subsets of NEET young people (unemployed and economically inactive), represent widely used alternatives. Figure 7 shows that in the UK, as of July to September 2024, 15.6% of 18–24-year-olds were NEET, comprising 6.5% unemployment and 9% economic inactivity[ref]Office for National Statistics (2024). Young people not in education, employment or training (NEET), UK: November 2024 [online]. Available from: www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/bulletins/youngpeoplenotineducationemploymentortrainingneet/november2024 [Accessed 12 February 2025].[/ref]. Between 2001 and 2024, the NEET rate for 18–24-year-olds has ranged from 1 in 9 people to close to 1 in 5 – nearly 1 million people. The Learning and Work Institute found that 58% of young people aged 16-24 in the UK who are NEET have never had a paid job, with worrying implications for their long-term opportunities[ref]Treneman, S., et al. (2025). Young people who are not in education, employment, or training – what does the data tell us?. Learning and Work Institute. Available from: https://learningandwork.org.uk/resources/research-and-reports/young-people-who-are-not-in-education-employment-or-training-what-does-the-data-tell-us/ [Accessed 10 April 2025].[/ref]. Recent research by the Resolution Foundation has found a strong association between mental health problems and employment outcomes: between 2018–2022, 1 in 5 (21%) of 18–24-year-olds with mental health problems were not in work, compared to 13% of those without them[ref]McCurdy, C., and Murphy, L. (2024). We’ve only just begun: Action to improve young people’s mental health, education and employment. Resolution Foundation. Available from: www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2024/02/Weve-only-just-begun.pdf.[/ref].
Figure 7: Percentage of 18–24-year-olds not in education, employment or training (NEET), showing split into unemployment and economic inactivity (UK, 2001–24, seasonally adjusted)[ref]Office for National Statistics (2024). Young people not in education, employment or training (NEET), UK: November 2024 [online]. Available from: www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/bulletins/youngpeoplenotineducationemploymentortrainingneet/november2024 [Accessed 12 February 2025].[/ref],[ref]Data from July to September 2022 onward has been reweighted, causing a step change discontinuity.[/ref]
There is a risk that any measure remains overly blunt: young people have been keen to stress that ‘good’ employment is what matters, with many young people facing a labour market defined by precarious, zero-hour contracts, limited prospects, and wages that don’t cover the cost of living.
Financial independence: Across different ages and stages, YIG members described their financial situation as shaping – often constraining – the opportunities available to them. While home ownership remains an aspiration for young people, it is now unobtainable for many through their 20s and beyond.
Discussions raised a need to better conceptualise and measure what financial independence from parents or carers looks like for today’s young people, in a context where many young people may remain in the family home for longer.
Wider financial pressures, such as coping with debt, are frequently mentioned. It is telling that 73% of 18–24-year-olds viewed “knowing your credit score” as a good indicator of adulthood[ref] McDonnell, A., and Ibbetson, C. (2021). What are the signs of being a grown up? [online]. YouGov. Available from: https://yougov.co.uk/society/articles/34454-signs-of-being-grown-up [Accessed 12 September 2024].[/ref] – a higher proportion than for all but one (having a full-time job) of the five markers (see Figure 4).
Digital markers: YIG members raised markers that would not have been features of previous generations’ journeys to adulthood, such as making your first social media account.
Understanding access and use of digital technologies is a further area for exploration and refinement, with young people’s digital lives a key theme of the Grown up? programme.
2. Limitations of the data
Three particular issues with the data underpinning the five traditional markers are worth highlighting:
Comparability of data across the four nations of the UK and understanding the role of place: Official statistics provide limited disaggregation by location, limiting our ability to explore how place may be mediating young people’s journeys. This is particularly important in relation to the four nations, where increasing policy differences have meant there is greater potential to understand how policy shapes journeys. For example, the aims, approaches, structures, pathways, funding, qualifications and regulations in post-16 education and training have all diverged across the four nations[ref]Robson, J., et al. (2024). Comparing policies, participation and inequalities across UK post-16 Education and Training landscapes. Centre for Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance (SKOPE) and Education Policy Institute. Research funded by the Nuffield Foundation.[/ref]. However, a recent study has noted how difficult it is to compare data across the four nations, with analysis hampered by different definitions or incomplete data, or cases where data is split across government departments[ref]Robson, J., et al. (2024). Comparing policies, participation and inequalities across UK post-16 Education and Training landscapes. Centre for Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance (SKOPE) and Education Policy Institute. Research funded by the Nuffield Foundation.[/ref].
Reliability of youth employment data: Concerns about the reliability of the Labour Force Survey limit our ability to identify and interpret recent trends in youth employment. As shown in Figure 3, there has been increased volatility in the reported employment rate for young people in recent years.
The pandemic is associated with a dramatic reduction in employment rates among 16–17-year-olds for both those in full-time education and not (see Figure 3). However, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) advises caution when interpreting the estimates of proportions of young people in employment[ref]Department for Education (2024). Participation in education, training and employment age 16 to 18 [online]. Available from: https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/participation-in-education-and-training-and-employment.[/ref], in large part due to falling response rates[ref]Cominetti, N., and Slaughter, H. (2024). Labour Market Outlook Q4 2024. Resolution Foundation. Available from: www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/labour-market-outlook-q4-2024/.[/ref]. Analysis by the Resolution Foundation suggests estimates have increasingly diverged from other administrative data sources, with a risk that employment rates are being underestimated and inactivity rates materially overestimated[ref]Corlett, A. (2024). Get Britain’s Stats Working: Exploring alternatives to Labour Force Survey Estimates. Resolution Foundation. Available from: www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/get-britains-stats-working/.[/ref].
Strengthening the reliability of data relating to youth employment will be central to policymakers’ efforts to better support young people’s journeys into employment[ref]Administrative Data Research UK’s (ADR UK) Youth Transitions project, is working to identify and address gaps in existing data and research, focusing on the journeys of disadvantaged young people into and out of education and employment. See: Agarwal, N. (2024). From gaps to priorities: Examining the evidence landscape. Youth Transitions Community Catalyst Research Report. National Foundation for Educational Research. Available from: www.adruk.org/news-publications/publications-reports/community-catalyst-youth-transitions-research-report-from-gaps-to-priorities-examining-the-evidence-landscape/.[/ref]. Grown up? will explore the particular challenges and opportunities young people face when moving from education to work in a rapidly changing labour market, with major policy changes in train, such as the rise in the National Living Wage for young people, at the same time as employers experience substantial increases in National Insurance[ref]Ray-Chaudhuri, S., Xu, X. (2025) Combined impact of minimum wage and tax increases may reduce opportunities for young people. Institute for Fiscal Studies. Available from: https://ifs.org.uk/articles/combined-impact-minimum-wage-and-tax-increases-may-reduce-opportunities-young-people [Accessed 7 April 2025].[/ref].
Social categorisation of Generation Z: While available statistics permit some disaggregation by socio-economic status and class, gender, and ethnicity, there are important disconnects between how different social categories are defined and measured, and the social identities and positions recognised and held by members of Gen Z. This can be seen most clearly in relation to gender. While official statistics often measure gender as binary, we know a higher proportion of Gen Z identify as trans and gender non-conforming[ref]Ipsos (2024). Ipsos Pride Survey 2024: Gen Zers most likely to identify as LGBT+. Available from: www.ipsos.com/en-uk/ipsos-pride-survey-2024-gen-zers-most-likely-identify-lgbt.[/ref] than previous generations.
The grouping of young people in datasets can also overlook important differences between people within a particular category. The recent review of available data by Administrative Data Research UK identified the need to avoid higher/broader aggregations – particularly concerning ethnicity[ref]For example, sub-groups such as Black Caribbean and Black African. Agarwal, N. (2024). From gaps to priorities: Examining the evidence landscape. Youth Transitions Community Catalyst Research Report. National Foundation for Educational Research. Available from: www.adruk.org/news-publications/publications-reports/community-catalyst-youth-transitions-research-report-from-gaps-to-priorities-examining-the-evidence-landscape/.[/ref].
3. Accounting for the diversity and complexity in young people’s lives
Cohort-wide trends in the five markers overlook profound differences and inequalities.
Data on when young people leave the family home helps illustrate how young people’s material resources, social position and where they live are all associated with diverging trajectories.
Gender: For example, there are stark and persistent differences in the age at which men and women leave the family home in the UK, with men living with parents to an older age. In 2023, there was a nine-percentage-point difference in the proportion of males and females aged 15–34 living with parents (46% of males compared with 37% of females[ref]Office for National Statistics (2024). Young adults living with their parents [online]. Available from: www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/datasets/youngadultslivingwiththeirparents/current [Accessed 11 September 2024].[/ref]). In 2000, it was 11 percentage points (41% of males compared with 30% of females).
This disparity between males and females grows starker into people’s 20s before reducing to a lesser but still significant difference by the mid-30s (see Figure 8). For example, while 38% of females live with their parents at 24, the figure rises to 56% for males [ref]Office for National Statistics (2024). Young adults living with their parents [online]. Available from: www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/datasets/youngadultslivingwiththeirparents/current [Accessed 11 September 2024].[/ref].
Figure 8: Proportion of young people living with parents* in the UK, 2000 and 2023 (by age and sex)[ref]Office for National Statistics (2024). Young adults living with their parents [online]. Available from: www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/datasets/youngadultslivingwiththeirparents/current [Accessed 11 September 2024].[/ref].
* ‘Parents’ is inclusive of grandparents/step-parents, but excludes ‘communal establishment’ populations, such as children’s care homes.
Ethnicity: Markers of growing up are also differentiated by ethnicity and not captured by the five traditional markers of adulthood. A recent analysis identified substantial variations in the prevalence of young people living with their parents according to ethnicity[ref]Atkinson, I., Boileau, B., and Sturrock, D. (2025). Hotel of Mum and Dad? Co-residence with parents among those aged 25-34. Institute for Fiscal Studies. Available from: https://ifs.org.uk/publications/hotel-mum-and-dad-co-residence-parents-among-those-aged-25-34.[/ref]. It found that rates of co-residence are highest among UK-born 25-34 year-olds of Bangladeshi (62%) and Indian (50%) heritage.
When controlling for a range of variables such as marital status, region of residence and economic activity, the factors do not explain the higher rates of co-residence for those from Black, Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Indian backgrounds/groups, pointing “to important differences in family support across ethnic groups”[ref]Atkinson, I., Boileau, B., and Sturrock, D. (2025). Hotel of Mum and Dad? Co-residence with parents among those aged 25-34. Institute for Fiscal Studies, p.15. Available from: https://ifs.org.uk/publications/hotel-mum-and-dad-co-residence-parents-among-those-aged-25-34.[/ref], and/or access to resources[ref]Atkinson, I., Boileau, B., and Sturrock, D. (2025). Hotel of Mum and Dad? Co-residence with parents among those aged 25-34. Institute for Fiscal Studies, p.15. Available from: https://ifs.org.uk/publications/hotel-mum-and-dad-co-residence-parents-among-those-aged-25-34.[/ref].
Income: The study also found a close association between income and co-residing with parents. Near half of 25–34-year-olds in the bottom quintile by income are living at a parental home, compared to 2% of those in the top quintile[ref]Atkinson, I., Boileau, B., and Sturrock, D. (2025). Hotel of Mum and Dad? Co-residence with parents among those aged 25-34. Institute for Fiscal Studies, p.15. Available from: https://ifs.org.uk/publications/hotel-mum-and-dad-co-residence-parents-among-those-aged-25-34.[/ref].
The financial drivers of co-residence are also clear, with those living with parents likely to be better able to reduce debts and increase savings or spending relative to those in private rented accommodation[ref]Atkinson, I., Boileau, B., and Sturrock, D. (2025). Hotel of Mum and Dad? Co-residence with parents among those aged 25-34. Institute for Fiscal Studies, p.15. Available from: https://ifs.org.uk/publications/hotel-mum-and-dad-co-residence-parents-among-those-aged-25-34.[/ref].
Place: Census data reveals substantial geographic inequalities in the proportion of young people who remain in the family home[ref]Census data includes a measure of the number of families with ‘adult children’, defined as a person aged over 18 years who is living with their parent(s) and does not have a spouse, partner or child living with them. It includes anyone aged 16–18 years who is not in full-time education and does not have a spouse, partner or child living with them (Office for National Statistics (2023). More adults living with their parents [online]. Available from: www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/articles/moreadultslivingwiththeirparents/2023-05-10 [Accessed 12 September 2024]).[/ref].
As Figure 9 shows, families in urban areas are more likely to have an ‘adult child’ (see endnote for definition) living with them. This is particularly true of London – with six of the ten local authorities having the highest proportion of ‘adult children’ residing with their families in England and Wales, in part reflecting higher housing costs. While almost 1 in 3 families in Brent had ‘adult children’ living with them, this figure is around 1 in 6 in the rural local authorities of Rutland and Cotswold.
Figure 9: Proportion of families living with ‘adult children’ by local authority, 2021 (England and Wales)[ref]Taken from Census 2011 and Census 2021 data. See: Office for National Statistics (2023). More adults living with their parents. Available from: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/articles/moreadultslivingwiththeirparents/2023-05-10.[/ref]
The data highlights not just inequalities but also how an individual’s circumstances come together to shape their journey, requiring an intersectional approach if we are to understand what underpins different trajectories into adulthood.
For example, in relation to young carers (children and young people under 18 who provide care to a friend or family member due to disability, illness, mental health problems, old age or an addiction[ref]Lacey, R., et al. (n.d.) The long-term effects of being a young carer. Available from: https://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/project/long-term-effects-of-being-a-young-carer[/ref]), we know that:
- Young people in single-parent households are twice as likely to be young carers than those in two-parent homes.
- Young people from homes with parents who are not working are four times more likely to be young carers than those with parents in managerial positions.
- Young people living in the most deprived areas are two times more likely to be young carers than those living in the least deprived areas.
- The prevalence of young carers rose with the COVID-19 pandemic, rising from 8% to 9.8–11.9% among 16–18-year-olds living in the UK[ref]Letelier, A., et al. (2024). Who are young carers in the UK? Understanding the prevalence and characteristics of adolescent young carers in the UK before and after COVID-19. St George’s, University of London, University College London and Carers Trust [online]. Available from: www.nuffieldfoundation.org/project/long-term-effects-of-being-a-young-carer. Research funded by the Nuffield Foundation.[/ref].
Young carers and care-experienced young people (young people who are or have been in the care of a local authority, such as those living in residential care, foster care, kinship care) are examples of groups whose trajectories may look quite distinct from the broader cohort, in that both have a sense of being thrust into adulthood at an earlier age and, often, with less support, see Generation abandoned? (Harker)[ref]Generation abandoned? by Lisa Harker, Nuffield Foundation, forthcoming.[/ref].
Young people with care responsibilities may take on more responsibilities and greater independence from an earlier age but may leave the family home later in life. Conversely, only 20% of care leavers aged 19–21 live with relatives or their former foster carers[ref]UK Government (2023). Looked after children aged 16 to 17 in independent or semi-independent placements, Reporting year 2022. Available from: https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/looked-after-children-aged-16-to-17-in-independent-or-semi-independent-placements/2022. These statistics have not been updated since 2022.[/ref]. At least 30% of 16- and 17-year-olds in care in England currently live in supported accommodation[ref]UK Government (2023). Looked after children aged 16 to 17 in independent or semi-independent placements, Reporting year 2022. Available from: https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/looked-after-children-aged-16-to-17-in-independent-or-semi-independent-placements/2022. These statistics showed that 30% of 16- and 17-year-olds in care were in these placements, but the statistics have not been updated since 2022. In the year to 31 March 2024 a total of 6,250 children were living in independent, semi-independent or supported accommodation in England, and an additional 3,790 children were living in ‘other placements’ which had not yet been registered as supported accommodation. There were 22,620 16–17-year-olds in care at this point. UK Government (2024). Children looked after in England including adoptions, Reporting year 2024. Available from https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/children-looked-after-in-england-including-adoptions/2024.[/ref], in which they are often expected to manage their own finances and shop, cook and clean for themselves[ref]Generation abandoned? by Lisa Harker, Nuffield Foundation, forthcoming.[/ref].
The complexity of young people’s needs and circumstances requires us to better see young people in the round, with greater sensitivity to individual circumstances.
It is often the combined impact of multiple, intersecting needs and circumstances – rather than any individual risk factor – that increases a young person’s vulnerability and that services struggle to respond to effectively[ref]Bevington, D., et al. (2023). Principles of care for children with complex needs and circumstances. Nuffield Family Justice Observatory. Available from: https://www.nuffieldfjo.org.uk/resource/principles-of-care-for-children-with-complex-needs. Research funded by the Nuffield Foundation.[/ref].
While there are diverse subgroups of young people that experience quite distinct trajectories into adulthood, efforts are also needed to better understand the common threads of inequality – such as poverty, poor mental health and school absences – shared by groups at the sharp end of inequalities.
4. Valuing the psychological, personal and relational aspects of journeys to adulthood
In his foundational work on ‘emerging adulthood’, Professor Jeffrey Arnett tells us that the markers of adulthood that young people view as most important are not socio-demographic. What’s important is said to be more personal, psychological and individualistic[ref]Arnett, J.J. (2024). Emerging Adulthood: The winding road from the late teens through the twenties (third edition). Oxford University Press.[/ref]. Arnett says becoming an adult today means becoming ‘self-sufficient’, with three criteria at the heart of it:
- Accepting responsibility for yourself
- Making independent decisions
- Becoming financially independent.
Rather than focusing on the traditional socio-demographic markers, a 2024 UK study of 18–77-year-olds found the most frequently endorsed characteristics of adulthood were: “accepting responsibility for the consequences of my actions”, endorsed by 80% of participants, and “being financially independent from my parents”, endorsed by 79%[ref]Wright, M., and von Stumm, S. (2024). Perceptions of Adulthood: What Does it Mean to be Grown-Up?. Journal of Adult Development 32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10804-024-09477-8. [/ref].
Figure 10: Endorsement of defining characteristics of adulthood by 18–77-year-olds (percentage of respondents)[ref]Wright, M., and von Stumm, S. (2024). Perceptions of Adulthood: What Does it Mean to be Grown-Up?. Journal of Adult Development 32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10804-024-09477-8. Item names shortened for clarity.[/ref]
Psychological, personal and relational aspects of journeys to adulthood have been recurring themes in what young people have told us about what matters most to them.
Psychological: While YIG members did speak of their journeys as periods of increasing responsibility and independence, some characterised the journey in ways that might be called ‘self-dependence’ instead of ‘self-sufficiency’. Rather than the positive framing of ‘self-sufficiency’, some YIG members spoke about having to stand on their own, rather than being able to.
They spoke of adulthood as a time when still-needed supports may be removed, when there would be “no more second chances” and feelings of pressure to, for example, move out of the family home, regardless of whether they were ready to or not.
Similarly, while Figure 10 frames a characteristic as “accepting responsibility” for one’s actions, YIG members spoke of being “held responsible”.
Developing a sense of identity and belonging was considered a core aspect of their journeys by some. They spoke of developing their own style, coming to appreciate their own uniqueness and caring less about what others think of them.
YIG members linked the new and heightened pressures and expectations as they grow up with effects on their mental health. A broad range of mental health pressures were identified: financial, familial expectations, lack of support, peer pressure and uncertainty about what comes next.
While some of these pressures are long-standing, such as those caused by examinations, they pinpointed more recent ones, such as social media and being subject to images and constructions of ‘perfection’.
Personal: When discussing the important milestones in contemporary journeys to adulthood, many YIG members raised markers that were specific to their own experiences and ambitions. These included ‘coming out’, leaving care and advocating for yourself with a medical professional.
For one aspiring footballer within the YIG, a first appearance for the senior team was the milestone that mattered most in her own journey.
They also raised various, smaller steps such as “walking to school on my own” and “paying my first bill” as important markers in their journeys. These examples are important reminders that, rather than ‘big ticket’ milestones, it is often the smaller ‘inchstones’ that are more meaningful to individuals.
Relational: Throughout discussions of markers, the crucial roles of family, friends, teachers, support groups and networks, and other trusted adults were stressed.
For some, this relational dimension was particularly acute. For example, for one care-experienced young person, navigating the journey to adulthood was about “working out the trusted adults that are still going to be there”[ref]Generation abandoned? by Lisa Harker, Nuffield Foundation, forthcoming.[/ref].
For many, the journey to adulthood seems more firmly rooted in continuing dependence on parents and family than ever before. There is a widespread view that the state has stepped back from providing vital forms of support to young people, creating a vacuum that families are expected to fill. This ‘Bank of Mum and Dad’ is much more than just financial; it includes emotional support and guidance, and backstop support like a bed they could use at any time – and it is not something that all can expect.
Parental expectations were also felt to constrain choices and journeys, with members feeling pressures to conform to traditional and cultural expectations around marriage and having children, for example.
Relatedly, YIG members spoke of the importance of parental and familial acceptance as young people express their identities. Friends were described as helping them to make the journey to adulthood easier, reflecting the fact that a slightly higher proportion of Gen Z has been found to aspire to have good friends than marriage (see Figure 5).
The emphasis young people placed on their relationships, social networks and trusted adults provides a vital challenge to the data we collect and the ways we conceptualise journeys to adulthood, often focusing on the individual and overlooking the relational aspects of young people’s journeys. This also has implications for developing effective policy responses which take into account the relational dimensions of young people’s lives.