

School Autonomy and the Teacher Labour Market

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
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Introduction

- ▶ Since 2002/03, 20% of secondary schools have become “sponsored academies”:
 - ▶ Upon approval of the Department for Education (DfE), schools acquire autonomy over teachers’ management, school curriculum, structure of school day/year
 - ▶ They get supervised by a Sponsor (Charity, Business, University)
 - ▶ 80% of these schools are deemed low-performing by OFSTED prior to conversion
- ▶ Attracting and retaining good teachers is especially challenging for disadvantaged schools (Glazerman et al. 2013, Springer et al. 2016, Swain et al. 2019, Benhenda 2020)
- ▶ Sponsored academies have improved students’ educational attainment (Eyles and Machin 2015, Eyles et al. 2016, Andrews et al. 2017)
- ▶ How do sponsored academies affect teachers’ hiring, retention, and pay?
 - ▶ We use secondary-school teachers’ data from the School Workforce Census (SWC) and the Database of Teacher Records (DTR) over period 2001/02-2018/19
 - ▶ Compare the evolution of the outcomes of interest around conversion in schools that convert earlier (treated) and schools that convert (4 years) later (control)



Headteachers



Source: DTR, SWC, 2001/02-2018/19.

- ▶ The conversion tends to be accompanied by a change in the headteacher
- ▶ We also find that the new headteacher tends to be more educated, and more likely to come from an outstanding school or a different local authority

Teachers' turnover



Source: DTR, SWC, 2001/02-2018/19.

- ▶ LHS: The share of teachers leaving the school increases just before the conversion
- ▶ LHS: It goes back to pre-conversion levels upon conversion
- ▶ RHS: The share of new hired teachers' increases from the conversion onward
- ▶ Teachers' and pupils' numbers decrease before conversion and recover thereafter

Teachers' composition and pay

1. Composition:

- ▶ The conversion changes the composition of teachers towards younger, more educated, higher-achieving teachers
- ▶ Teachers coming from other schools are more likely to come from outstanding schools or other LAs

2. Teachers' pay:

- ▶ The composition of teachers' pay shifts away from additional payments such as “teaching and learning responsibility payments”
- ▶ Pay dispersion across equally experienced teachers increases in the second year after conversion

Discussion

- ▶ Disadvantaged, OFSTED-deemed low-performing schools that convert into sponsored academies experience a substantial change of management
- ▶ The conversion does not increase teachers' retention, but leads to a change in teachers' composition:
 - ▶ Sponsored academies are able to attract more educated and high-achieving teachers, both from outstanding schools and other sectors
- ▶ Sponsored academies also limit the use of additional payments in teachers' pay
- ▶ We are currently working on:
 - ▶ Studying medium/long-term dynamics
 - ▶ Estimating spillover effects to non-academy schools
- ▶ Implications: importance of the school management to attract high-quality teachers and improve students' outcomes

([Bender et al. 2018](#), [Huber et al. 2021](#), [Lavy et al. 2023](#))

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